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Abstract
Recently there has been increased interest in logic programming-based default reasoning
approaches which are not using negation-as-failure in their object language. Instead, default
reasoning is modelled by rules and a priority relation among them. In this paper we compare
the expressive power of two approaches in this family of logics: Defeasible Logic, and sceptical
Logic Programming without Negation as Failure (LPwNF). Our results show that the former
has a strictly stronger expressive power. The dierence is caused by the latter logic’s failure to
capture the idea of teams of rules supporting a specific conclusion. Ó 2000 Published by
Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Defeasible logic; Logic programming
1. Introduction
Recently there has been increased interest in modelling default reasoning by
means of rules without negation as failure, and a priority relation. In fact [12] argues
that the concept of priority is more basic than the concept of a default.
Defeasible Logic [9,10] is an early approach to sceptical nonmonotonic reasoning
[1] which was based on rules without negation as failure, plus a priority relation. In
fact it has an implementation as a straightforward extension of Prolog [4].
Logic Programming without Negation as Failure (LPwNF) is a recent approach,
introduced in [7] and studied in [5]. It supports both credulous and sceptical reason-
ing, unlike defeasible logic, and has an argumentation-theoretic characterisation.
The contribution of this paper is to compare defeasible logic with sceptical LPwNF.
We discuss how the two approaches dier. The main dierence is that LPwNF does
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not take into account teams of rules [6] supporting a conclusion (all rules with the same
head form a team), but rather views rules individually. By doing so, LPwNF fails to
draw desirable conclusions that defeasible logic can, as we show in this paper. On
the other hand, defeasible logic can prove everything that sceptical LPwNF can.
Finally we briefly compare defeasible logic with two further approaches, courte-
ous logic programs [6] and priority logic [12,13].
2. Basics of defeasible logic
In this paper we restrict attention to propositional defeasible logic, and assume
that the reader is familiar with the notation and basic notions of propositional logic.
If q is a literal,  q denotes the complementary literal (if q is a positive literal p then
 q is :p; and if q is :p, then  q is p).
A rule r consists of its antecedent Ar (written on the left; Armay be omitted if it
is the empty set) which is a finite set of literals, an arrow, and its consequent (or head)
Cr which is a literal. In writing rules we omit set notation for antecedents. There
are three kinds of rules: Strict rules are denoted by A! p and represent indisputable
conclusions (‘‘Emus are birds’’); defeasible rules are denoted by A) p and represent
conclusions that can be defeated by contrary evidence (‘‘Birds usually fly’’); and def-
eaters are denoted by A,p and represent knowledge which might prevent the con-
clusion :p from being drawn without directly supporting the conclusion p
(‘‘Heavy animals may not fly’’). Given a set R of rules, we denote the set of all strict
rules in R by Rs, and the set of strict and defeasible rules in R by Rsd . Rq denotes the
set of rules in R with consequent q.
A superiority relation on R is an acyclic relation > on R (that is, the transitive clo-
sure of > is irreflexive), and is used to represent priority information among rules. A
defeasible theory T is a triple F ;R; > where F is a finite set of literals (called facts), R
a finite set of rules, and > a superiority relation on R.
A conclusion of T is a tagged literal and can have one of the following four forms:
· Dq, which is intended to mean that q is definitely provable in T;
· ÿDq, which is intended to mean that we have proved that q is not definitely prov-
able in T;
· @q, which is intended to mean that q is defeasibly provable in T;
· ÿ@q which is intended to mean that we have proved that q is not defeasibly prov-
able in T.
A derivation (or proof) in T  F ;R; > is a finite sequence P  P 1; . . . ; P n of
tagged literals satisfying the following conditions (P 1::i denotes the initial part of
the sequence P of length i):
D: If Pi 1  Dq then either
q 2 F or
9r 2 Rsq 8a 2 Ar : Da 2 P1::i
ÿD: If Pi 1  ÿDq then
q 62 F and
8r 2 Rsq 9a 2 Ar : ÿDa 2 P1::i
@: If P i 1  @q then either
(1) Dq 2 P 1::i or
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(2) 9r 2 Rsd q such that
(2.1) 8a 2 Ar : @a 2 P 1::i and
(2.2) ÿD  q 2 P 1::i and
(2.3) 8s 2 R q, either
(2.3.1) 9a 2 As : ÿ@a 2 P 1::i or
(2.3.2) 9t 2 Rsd q such that
8a 2 At : @a 2 P1::i and t > s
ÿ@: If P i 1  ÿ@q then
(1) ÿDq 2 P 1::i and
(2) (2.1) 8r 2 Rsd q 9a 2 Ar : ÿ@a 2 P 1::i or
(2.2) D  q 2 P 1::i or
(2.3) 9s 2 R q such that
(2.3.1) 8a 2 As : @a 2 P 1::i and
(2.3.2) 8t 2 Rsd q either
9a 2 At : ÿ@a 2 P1::i or t s
The elements of a derivation are called lines of the derivation. We say that a tagged
literal L is provable (or derivable) in T  F ;R; >, denoted T ‘ L, i there is a der-
ivation in T such that L is a line of a proof P.
Even though the definition seems complicated, it follows ideas which are intuitive-
ly appealing. For an explanation of this definition see [8].
In the remainder of this paper we will only need to consider defeasible rules and a
superiority relation; facts, strict rules and defeaters will not be necessary.
Example 1 (adapted from [5]).
We can derive @:penguintweety because both rules r3 and r4 are applicable (with
instantiation tweety) and r4 is stronger than r3. For the same reason we can derive
ÿ@penguintweety.
The fact f1 allows us to derive Dbirdtweety, thus also @birdtweety. There-
fore rule r1 (with instantiation tweety) is applicable. Moreover rule r2, the only pos-
sible way for proving :flytweety, cannot be applied because we have already
derived ÿ@penguintweety. Thus we can derive flytweety.
3. LPwNF
In LPwNF [5], a logic program consists of a set of rules of the form
p  q1; . . . ; qn, where p; q1; . . . ; qn are literals, and an irreflexive and antisymmetric
priority relation > among rules.
r1 : birdX  ) flyX  r5 : penguinX  ) birdX 
r2 : penguinX  ) :flyX  f1 : birdtweety
r3 : walkslikepengX  ) penguinX  f2 : walkslikepengtweety
r4 : :flatfeetX  ) :penguinX  f3 : :flatfeettweety
r2 > r1
r4 > r3
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Ref. [5] introduced a proof theory and a corresponding argumentation frame-
work. The main idea of LPwNF is the following: In order to prove a literal q, a type
A derivation must be found which proves q. One part of this derivation is a top-level
proof of q in the sense of logic programming (SLD-resolution). But additionally ev-
ery attack on this argument must be counterattacked. Attacks are generated in type
B derivations. For an A derivation to succeed all B derivations must fail.
In general, a rule r in a type B derivation can attack a rule r0 in a type A derivation
if they have complementary heads, and r is not weaker than r0, that is, r0¥ r. On the
other hand, a rule r in a type A derivation can attack a rule r0 in a type B derivation if
they have complementary heads, and r > r0. This reflects the notion of scepticism: it
should be easier to attack a positive argument than to counterattack (i.e.attack the
attacker). For example, consider the following program which is the same as Exam-
ple 1, but for variations of syntax.
Example 2.
Here it is possible to prove flytweety. Firstly there is a standard SLD refutation (A
derivation) of flytweety via the rules r1 and r6. Additionally we need to consider
all possible attacks on this refutation. In our case, r1 can be attacked by r2. Thus we
start a B derivation with goal  :flytweety (with first rule r2), and have to show
that this proof fails. This happens because the rule r3 is successfully counterattacked
by r4. There are no other attacks on the original derivation. The following figure
illustrates how the reasoning proceeds.
r1 : flyX   birdX  r5 : birdX   penguinX 
r2 : :flyX   penguinX  r6 : birdtweety  
r3 : penguinX   walkslikepengX  r7 : walkslikepengtweety  
r4 : :penguinX   :flatfeetX  r8 : :flatfeettweety  
r2 > r1
r4 > r3
50 G. Antoniou et al. / J. Logic Programming 42 (2000) 47–57
Below we give the formal definition. LPwNF can support either credulous or scep-
tical reasoning. Since in this paper we are interested in a comparison with defeasible
logic, we will restrict ourselves to the sceptical case (as we have already done so far in
this section). Also, our presentation is slightly simpler than that of [5]. The reason is
that in their paper, Dimopoulos and Kakas showed the soundness of their proof the-
ory w.r.t. an argumentation framework, and they had to make the definition of der-
ivations more complicated to collect the appropriate rules which are used to build an
appropriate argument. This is not our concern here, so we just focus on the deriva-
tion of formulae.
A type A derivation from G1; r to Gn; r is a sequence G1; r; G2; r; . . . ;
Gn; r, where r is a rule, and each Gi has the form  q;Q, where q is the selected
literal and Q a sequence of literals. For Gi, i P 1, if there is a rule ri such that
either
1. i  1, ri > r, ri resolves with Gi on q, and there is a type B derivation from
f  qg; ri to ;; ri or
2. i > 1, ri resolves with Gi on q, and there is a type B derivation from f ~qg; ri to
;; ri
then Gi1 is the resolvent of ri with Gi.
A type B derivation from F1; r to Fn; r is a sequence F1; r; F2; r; . . . ; Fn; r,
where every Fi is of the form Fi  f q;Qg [ F 0i , q the selected literal, and Fi1 is con-
structed from Fi as follows:
1. For i  1, F1 must have the form  q. Let R be the set of rules ri which
resolve with  q, and which satisfy the condition ri¥ r. Let C be the set of resol-
vents of  q with the rules in R. If  62 C then F2  C; otherwise there is
no F2;
2. For i > 1, let R be the set of rules ri which resolve with q;Q on q. Let R0 be the
subset of R containing all rules ri such that there is no A derivation from
  q; ri to ; ri. Let C be the set of all resolvents of the rules in R0 with the
rule  q;Q, by resolving on q. If  62 C then Fi1  C [ F 0i ; otherwise there is
no Fi1.
4. A comparison of LPwNF and defeasible logic
Given a logic program without negation as failure P, let T P  be the defeasible
theory containing the same rules as P, written as defeasible rules, and the same su-
periority relation. In other words, rules in LPwNF are represented as defeasible rules
in defeasible logic.
If we study the used in the previous sections, we see that in both approaches we
are able to prove flytweety. Moreover the idea used in both approaches is similar:
Firstly we need a reasoning chain that leads to this conclusion, the application of rule
r1 being the final step. And secondly we need to consider a possible attack by rule r2,
and need to make sure that the rule does not apply because we cannot prove
penguintweety.
A dierence is that LPwNF takes a top down approach while a derivation in de-
feasible logic works bottom up. But this dierence is not fundamental, and we are
able to show that every conclusion provable in LPwNF can be derived in defeasible
logic.
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Theorem 4.1. Let q be a literal which can be sceptically proven in the logic program
without negation as failure P, that is, there is a type A derivation from  q; r to
; r for some rule r. Then T P  ‘ @q.
We need the following technical result from [2].
Lemma 4.1. Let T be a defeasible theory containing no strict rules. If T ‘ @q then
T ‘ ÿ@  q.
The theorem follows directly from the following result.
Lemma 4.2. Suppose that there is a type A derivation from G; rto ; r in P, where
G   q1; . . . ; qn. Then T P  ‘ @qi for all i  1; . . . ; n.
Proof. We use induction on the total length of the type A derivation, that is, on the
number of steps in all type A and type B derivations used to establish the top level
type A derivation.
Suppose that the top level type A derivation is G1; r; . . . ; Gk; r, where G1  G
and Gk  . Consider the first step in this derivation. There must be a rule r1 resolv-
ing with G on q1. Then G2 is the resolvent of r1 with G. Suppose that
r1  q1  p1; . . . ; ps; 1
So G2   p1; . . . ; ps; q2; . . . ; qn. Furthermore,
there must be a type B derivation from f  q1g; r1 to ;; r1: 2
Note that there is a type A derivation from G2; r to ; r which is shorter than the
original derivation starting at G1; r. So we can apply the induction hypothesis and
get:
T P  ‘ @pj for j  1; . . . ; s; T P  ‘ @qi for i  2; . . . ; n: 3
We complete the proof by showing that we also have T P  ‘ @q1. Conditions (1)
and (3) say that there is a rule with head q1 such that for all a in the antecedent
of the rule, T P  ‘ @a. Furthermore T P  ‘ ÿD  q1, since T P  includes neither
facts nor strict rules. In the following we show that every rule with head  q1 which
is not inferior to r1 is not applicable, that is, we can prove T P  ‘ ÿ@b for at least
one antecedent b of the rule. Then we are finished, by the definition of condition
@ in the definition of a derivation in Section 2.1
Auxiliary inductive proof: We show that within a successful type A derivation, if
there is a B derivation in P from F ; r0 to ;; r0, then for every goal G 2 F there
is a literal q 2 G with T P ‘ ÿ@q. Together with 2 above, this completes our
proof. In the following we make use of induction on the total length of the type B
derivation, that is we count all steps in all type B and type A auxiliary derivations
as well. Consider the type B derivation F1; r0; F2; r0; . . . ; Fn; r0, where F1  F
and Fn  ;.
1 Ref. [3] showed that the concatenation of derivations is still a derivation. Thus the results T P  ‘ @a,
T P ‘ ÿ@b etc. can be combined into one derivation, as is required in the definition of Section 2.
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Case 1: F1; r0 is the first pair in a type B derivation originating a type A deriva-
tion. In that case F1  f qg. Let R be the set of rules r00 which resolve with  q,
and which satisfy the condition r00¥ r0. Let C be the set of resolvents of  q with
the rules in R. We know that  2 C, otherwise we would stop and not be able to de-
rive ;; r0, as we assumed. So F2  C. We also know that there is a type B derivation
from F2; r0 to ;; r0. By the induction hypothesis (auxiliary induction proof), we
conclude that for all G 2 F2 there is q0 in G such that T P ‘ ÿ@q0. By the construc-
tion of F2 we have
Ar00 with head qr00¥ r0 ) 9a 2 Ar00 : T P  ‘ ÿ@a: 4
Note that T P  ‘ ÿDq, since the strict part of T P  is empty. Using this fact and (4)
we conclude, by clause (2.3) of the ÿ@ condition on proofs (where s is r0), that
T P  ‘ ÿ@q, which is what we had to prove.
Case 2: Otherwise, let q;Q be the goal in F such that q is selected to be resolved
in the next step. According to the definition of a type B derivation, we consider R,
the set of rules r0 which resolve with q;Q on q. Let R0 be the subset of R containing
all rules r0 such that there is not a type A derivation from   q; r0 to ; r0. Let C
be the set of all resolvents of the rules in R0 with the goal  q;Q, resolving on q.
Again we note that  62 C (otherwise we could not derive ;; r0); therefore
F2  C [ F1 ÿ f q;Qg.
Case 2.1: Suppose that R0 6 R, that is, for at least one rule r0 2 R there is a type A
derivation from   q; r0 to ; r0. This type A derivation is part of the original,
top level derivation mentioned in the lemma. Thus we can apply the induction hy-
pothesis of the main inductive proof, and conclude T P  ‘ @  q. By Lemma 4.1
T P  ‘ ÿ@q. Thus the claim of the auxiliary inductive proof is true for the goal
 q;Q in F1. The other goals in F1 are also included in F2, by definition. Thus we
can apply the induction hypothesis (auxiliary induction proof) and get that in every
such goal G0 there is a literal q0 such that T P  ‘ ÿ@q0. Thus the proof is completed in
this case.
Case 2.2: R  R0. In this case for every rule q B, the goal  B;Q is included in
F2. By the induction hypothesis (auxiliary induction), in every such goal there is at
least one literal s such that T P ‘ ÿ@s.
Subcase 2.2.1: In at least one of these goals there is a literal p in Q such that
T P  ‘ ÿ@p. Then we can use this for the goal  q;A, too.
Subcase 2.2.2: Otherwise, in each goal B;Q, there must be a literal b in B such
that T P  ‘ ÿ@b. Therefore there is no rule with head q such that all its antecedents
are provable in T P . By the definition of ÿ@ in Section 2.2, we conclude
T P  ‘ ÿ@q.
In both subcases above we have shown that the claim of the auxiliary induction
proof is true for the goal  q;Q. Again the other goals in F1 are also included in
F2, by definition. Thus, by the induction hypothesis (auxiliary induction proof), in
every such goal G0 there is a literal q0 such that T P  ‘ ÿ@q0. Thus the proof is com-
pleted in this case, too. This completes the entire proof. 
However the reverse is not true. The reason is that LPwNF argues on the basis of
individual rules, whereas defeasible logic argues on the basis of teams of rules with the
same head. The dierence can be illustrated by the following simple example.
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Example 3.
Intuitively we conclude that platypus is a mammal because for every reason against
this conclusion (r3 and r4) there is a stronger reason for mammalplatypus (r1 and r2
respectively). It is easy to see that @mammalplatypus is indeed provable in defea-
sible logic: there is a rule in support of mammalplatypus, and every rule for
:mammalplatypus is overridden by a rule for mammalplatypus.
On the other hand, the corresponding logic program without negation as failure is
unable to prove mammalplatypus: If we start with r1, trying to build an A deriva-
tion, then we must counter the attack r4 (which is not inferior to r1) used in a B der-
ivation. But LPwNF does not allow counterattacks on r4 by another rule with head
mammalplatypus, but only by an attack on the body of r4. The latter is impossible
in our case (there is no rule matching :hasBillplatypus). Thus the attack via r4 suc-
ceeds and the proof of mammalplatypus via r1 fails. Similarly, the proof of
mammalplatypus via r2 fails, due to an attack via rule r3. Thus mammalplatypus
cannot be proven.
It is instructive that even if LPwNF is modified to allow counterattacks on the
same literal on which a rule r attacks a type A derivation, still we would not get
the desired conclusion in the example above. With this modification, r1 is attacked
by r4, which is counterattacked by r2, which is attacked by r3, which is counterat-
tacked by r1, which is attacked by r4, etc. Defeasible logic breaks this cycle by re-
cognising that any rule attacking the argument can be ‘‘trumped’’ by a superior
rule supporting the argument. This dierence illustrates once again the absence of
the idea of a team of rules in LPwNF.
We conclude this section with some remarks on the comparison of the relative
strength of dierent nonmonotonic inference systems. Consider the following general
argument2. Suppose that a sceptical nonmonotonic inference system L1 is strictly
stronger than another L2. Then there is a theory T and a conclusion p such that p
can be proven from T in L1 but not in L2. Now add to T the rules q and
:q p. It would appear that in L1 we cannot prove q because the second rule fires,
while in L2 we cannot prove p; thus we can prove q. But then L1 is not stronger than
L2.
This argument is not valid in all cases and, in particular, in discussing the relative
strength of defeasible logic and LPwNF as demonstrated by the following example.
Example 4. Consider the defeasible theory of Example 3, extended by the following
two rules:
r1 : monotremeX  ) mammalX  monotremeplatypus
r2 : hasFurX  ) mammalX  hasFurplatypus
r3 : laysEggsX  ) :mammalX  laysEggsplatypus
r4 : hasBillX  ) :mammalX  hasBillplatypus
r1 > r3
r2 > r4
2 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting a discussion of this point.
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r5 :) q
r6 : mammalplatypus ) :q
As expected, we cannot derive q in defeasible logic because r6 is applicable and not
weaker than r5. But neither can we prove q from the corresponding LPwNF pro-
gram. The only possible proof of q would involve rule r5 which is attacked by a
B-derivation which involves r6 and one of r1 and r2 (with instantiation platypus),
say r1. Since there is no rule stronger than r1 the attack succeeds and the proof of
q fails.
A similar situation occurs in the nonmonotonic semantics of logic programs
where, for example, the well-founded semantics is stronger than Kunen’s semantics.
5. Other approaches
Courteous logic programs [6] share some basic ideas of defeasible logic. In partic-
ular, the approach is logic programming based, implements sceptical reasoning, and
is based on competing teams of rules, and a priority relation. It imposes a total strat-
ification on the logic program by demanding that the atom dependency graph be
acyclic. This ensures that each stratum contains only rules with head p or :p. An an-
swer set is built gradually, stratum by stratum.
Compared to defeasible logic, courteous logic programs are more specialized in
the following respects: (i) The atom dependency graph of a courteous logic program
must be acyclic. This condition is central in the courteous logic program framework,
but is not necessary in defeasible logic; (ii) Defeasible logic distinguishes between
strict and defeasible conclusions, courteous logic programs do not. Thus defeasible
logic is more fine-grained; (iii) Defeasible logic has the concept of a defeater, cour-
teous logic programs do not. Thus defeasible logic oers a greater flexibility in the
expression of information.
On the other hand, there seems to be a major dierence between the two ap-
proaches, in that courteous logic programs may use negation as failure. However,
a courteous logic program with negation as failure C can be modularly translated
into a program C0 without negation as failure using auxiliary predicates (a technique
often used in logic programming, e.g. [7]): Every rule
r : L L1 ^    ^ Ln ^ fail M1 ^    ^ fail Mk
can be replaced by the rules:
r : L L1 ^    ^ Ln ^ pr
pr  
:pr  M1
. . .
:pr  Mk
where pr is a new propositional atom. If we restrict attention to the language of C.
the programs C and C0 have the same answer set.
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Thus, without loss of generality we may assume that a courteous logic program C
does not use negation as failure. The corresponding defeasible theory df C is ob-
tained by representing every rule in C0 by an equivalent defeasible rule, and by using
the same priority relation as C.
Theorem 5.1. Let C be a courteous logic program. A literal q is in the answer set of C
iff df(C)‘ @q.
It is worth mentioning that despite the underlying assumption of acyclicity, cour-
teous logic programs are not a special case of LPwNF, because they do incorporate
the idea of a team. For example, consider the program in Example 3.
mammalplatypus can be proven in courteous logic programs, but not in LPwNF.
Priority logic [12,13] is a knowledge representation language where a theory con-
sists of logic programming-like rules, and a priority relation among them. The mean-
ing of the priority relation is that once a rule r is included in an argument, all rules
inferior to r are automatically blocked from being included in the same argument.
The semantics of priority logic is based on the notion of a stable argument for the
credulous case, and the well-founded argument for the sceptical case.
Priority logic is a general framework with many instantiations (based on so-called
extensibility functions), and supports both credulous and sceptical reasoning. To al-
low a fair comparison to defeasible logic, one has to impose the following restric-
tions: (i) We will only consider defeasible rules in the sense of defeasible logic.
That is, we will not distinguish between strict and defeasible rules, and we will re-
strict attention to rules in which only propositional literals occur (but not more gen-
eral formulae, as in priority logic). Also, there will be no defeaters. (ii) The priority/
superiority relation will only be defined on pairs of rules with complementary heads.
(iii) We will consider the two basic instantiations of priority logic, as determined by
the extensibility functions R1 and R2 (see [12,13] for details). (iv) We will compare
defeasible logic to the sceptical interpretation of priority logic.
Under these conditions, the dierence between defeasible logic and priority logic
is highlighted by the following example.
Example 5.
The priority relation is empty.
(Obviously in defeasible logic we consider r1–r7 to be defeasible rules.) In priority
logic, if we use the extensibility relation R1, then the well-founded argument is the set
of all rules, and therefore inconsistent. On the other hand, in the defeasible logic ver-
sion T of the priority logic program, T0 @pacifist, so the approaches are dierent.
And if we use the extensibility relation R2, then priority logic does not allow one
to prove :antimilitary. But defeasible logic can prove @:antimilitary. The dier-
ence is caused by the fact that defeasible logic does not propagate ambiguity, as ex-
tension-based formalisms like priority logic do (for a discussion of this issue see [11]).
r1 : quaker  r5 : footballfan republican
r2 : republican r6 : antimilitary  pacifist
r3 : pacifist  quaker r7 : :antimilitary  footballfan
r4 : :pacifist republican
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6. Conclusion
We have looked at the relationship between four logic programming-based for-
malisms that employ a priority relation among rules and take a sceptical approach
to inference. Three, defeasible logic, LPwNF and courteous logic programs, belong
to the same ‘‘school’’ while priority logic takes a fundamentally dierent approach,
which is evident in its propagation of ambiguity.
Of the three formalisms in the same school, defeasible logic is the most powerful.
It is able to draw more conclusions (from the same rules) than LPwNF can, princi-
pally because it argues on the basis of teams of rules. Courteous logic programs also
employ teams of rules, but the approach is severely restricted in that the atom depen-
dency graph is required to be acyclic. In addition, of course, defeasible logic makes a
distinction between definite knowledge (obtained by facts and strict rules) and defea-
sible knowledge.
These results indicate that defeasible logic deserves more attention. In other pa-
pers [2,8] we have studied the logic as a formal system, including representation re-
sults, properties of the inference relation, and semantics.
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